Ethics of Belief and Beyond

1. Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind

Sebastian Schmidt

Part I: New Perspectives on Belief Normativity

A. Doxastic Agency and Responsibility

2. Implications of the Debate on Doxastic Voluntarism for W. K. Clifford's Ethics of Belief

Martina Lindner

3. Believing as We Ought and the Democratic Route to Knowledge

Matthew Chrisman

4. Responsibility for Doxastic Strength Grounds Responsibility for Belief

Benoit Gaultier

B. Reasons for Belief

5. Relationships and Reasons for Belief

Lindsay Crawford

6. Instrumental Reasons for Belief: Elliptical Talk and Elusive Properties

Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen and Mattias Skipper

7. Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic

Errol Lord

Part II: Facets of an Ethics of Mind

A. Responsibility, Reasons, and Rationality

8. Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame

Sebastian Schmidt

9. Two Kinds of Rationality

Gerhard Ernst

B. The Ethics of Blame, Fear, Decision, Passing Thought, and Phantasy

10. The Ethics of Blame: A Primer

D. Justin Coates

11. How Safe Should We Feel? The Ethics of Fear in the Public Sphere

Sabine A. Doering

12. Determining the Future

Matthew Soteriou

13. Silence and Salience: On Being Judgmental

Neal A. Tognazzini

14. The Value of a Free and Wandering Mind

Miriam Schleifer McCormick

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• A teoria psicológica e escolas de pensamento
• Epistemologia e teoria do conhecimento: Filosofia
• Ética e filosofia moral
• Filosofia da mente

Rational Response System;Gerhard Ernst;Doxastic Involuntarists;Sebastian Schmidt;Vice Versa;Matthew Chrisman;Evidential Considerations;D. Justin Coates;Doxastic Voluntarism;Sabine Doering;Practical Instrumental Reasons;Martina Lindner;Violate;Errol Lord;Wo;Miriam Schleifer McCormick;Non-evidential Reasons;Anne Meylan;Non-evidential Considerations;Matthew Soteriou;Epistemic Norms;Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen;Epistemic Reason;Neal Tognazzini;Non-evidential Factors;epistemology;Fear Narratives;ethics of belief;Pro Tanto Reason;mental normativity;Voluntary Control;rationality;Practical Deliberation;doxastic normativity;Instrumental Normativity;ethics of mind;Paradigm Scenarios;doxastic agency;Evaluative Belief;Higher Order Belief;W.K. Clifford;Transmission Principle;self-deception;Mind Wandering;delusion;Epistemic Rationality;instrumental transmission;Requirement Account;mental pragmatism;reasons;constitutivism;blame;salience