Inference and Consciousness

Introduction: Inference and Consciousness

Anders Nes

Part I. Unconscious Inference in Cognitive Science and Psychiatry



Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Achievement
Kirk Ludwig and Wade Munroe


A Realist Perspective on Bayesian Cognitive Science
Michael Rescorla


The Role of Unconscious Inference in Models of Delusion Formation
Federico Bongiorno and Lisa Bortolotti

Part II. Inference in Speech Comprehension


Seeing and hearing meanings - A Non-Inferential Approach to Speech Comprehension
Berit Brogaard


Metacognition and Inferential Accounts of Communication
Nicholas Allott

Part III. Inference, Structure, and Generality


Non-Inferential Transitions: Imagery and Association
Jake Quilty-Dunn and Eric Mandelbaum


Knowledge of Logical Generality and the Possibility of Deductive Reasoning
Corine Besson

Part IV. Conscious Non-Demonstrative Inference


Fore- and Background in Conscious Non-Demonstrative Inference
Anders Nes


Morphological Content and Chromatic Illumination in Belief-Fixation
David Henderson, Terry Horgan, and Matjaz Potrc?

Part V. Inference and Perceptual and Introspective Knowledge


Experience and Epistemic Structure: Can Cognitive Penetration Result in Epistemic Downgrade?
Elijah Chudnoff


The Transparency of Inference

Ram Neta

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• Percepção
• Filosofia da mente
• A teoria psicológica e escolas de pensamento
• Epistemologia e teoria do conhecimento: Filosofia

Epistemic Downgrade;Vice Versa;Timothy Chan;Capgras Delusion;Anders Nes;Occurrent Mental State;Eric Mandelbaum;Chromatic Illumination;Nico Orlandi;Phenomenal Conservatism;Kirk Ludwig;Prima Facie Justification;Wade Munroe;Bayesian Norms;Keith Frankish;Amodal Completion;Terry Horgan;Subpersonal Level;Matjaz Potrc;Cognitive Penetration;Mark Timmons;Doxastic Justification;Brit Brogaard;Non-demonstrative Inference;Nicholas Allott;Content Specific Rule;Elijah Chudnoff;Inferential Transitions;Ram Neta;Mental Processes;inference;Mental Activity;consciousness;Utterance Interpretation;philosophy of mind;Jill's Experience;epistemology;Perceptual Inference;perception;Presentational Phenomenology;cognitive psychology;Belief Fixation;philosophy of psychology;Gist Representations;cognitive phenomenology;Anomalous Experience;abductive inference;Substitution Instances;expertise;conscious inference;unconscious inference;cognitive architecture;reasoning;dual process theory;belief-fixation;gut feeling;immediate justification;metacognition;rule following;experience;epistemic structure