Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons
portes grátis
Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons
Vahid, Hamid
Taylor & Francis Ltd
08/2022
232
Mole
Inglês
9780367511012
15 a 20 dias
340
Descrição não disponível.
Introduction
Part I: Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons
1. Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework
2. A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification
3. Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation
Part II: Perceptual Reasons
4. The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience
5. Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification
6. Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons
Part III: Consequences
7. Higher-order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat
8. The Nature of Inference
9. The Epistemic Value of Emotions
10. Motivational Internalism and Motivating Reasons
11. Self-knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the Transparency Procedure
Part I: Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons
1. Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework
2. A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification
3. Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation
Part II: Perceptual Reasons
4. The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience
5. Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification
6. Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons
Part III: Consequences
7. Higher-order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat
8. The Nature of Inference
9. The Epistemic Value of Emotions
10. Motivational Internalism and Motivating Reasons
11. Self-knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the Transparency Procedure
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Propositional Justification;Doxastic Justification;Hamid Vahid;Dispositional Account;epistemic reasons;epistemology;Epistemic Disposition;Perceptual Justification;Justified Belief;justification for belief;Dispositional Structure;metaethics;Deviant Causal Chains;epistemic basing relation;Motivating Reasons;Perceptual Beliefs;self-knowledge;Normative Reasons;defeat;Dispositional Property;evidentialism;Higher Order Evidence;motivational internalism;Epistemic Defeat;representational content;Epistemic Justification;dispositions;Dispositional Framework;competences;Narrow Scope Reading;circularity problem;Positive Epistemic Status;disposition ascriptions;Higher Order Belief;perceptual entitlement;Rational Commitment;Tyler Burge;Perceptual Reasons;cognitive penetration;Epistemically Significant;higher-order defeat;Red Table;higher-order evidence;Deontological Justification;inference
Introduction
Part I: Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons
1. Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework
2. A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification
3. Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation
Part II: Perceptual Reasons
4. The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience
5. Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification
6. Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons
Part III: Consequences
7. Higher-order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat
8. The Nature of Inference
9. The Epistemic Value of Emotions
10. Motivational Internalism and Motivating Reasons
11. Self-knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the Transparency Procedure
Part I: Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons
1. Possessing Reasons: A Dispositional Framework
2. A Dispositional Analysis of Propositional and Doxastic Justification
3. Dispositions and the Problem of the Basing Relation
Part II: Perceptual Reasons
4. The Epistemic Value of Perceptual Experience
5. Epistemic Conservatism and Perceptual Justification
6. Dogmatism: The Dispositional Structure of Perceptual Reasons
Part III: Consequences
7. Higher-order Evidence and the Dispositional Structure of Epistemic Defeat
8. The Nature of Inference
9. The Epistemic Value of Emotions
10. Motivational Internalism and Motivating Reasons
11. Self-knowledge: The Epistemic Significance of the Transparency Procedure
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Propositional Justification;Doxastic Justification;Hamid Vahid;Dispositional Account;epistemic reasons;epistemology;Epistemic Disposition;Perceptual Justification;Justified Belief;justification for belief;Dispositional Structure;metaethics;Deviant Causal Chains;epistemic basing relation;Motivating Reasons;Perceptual Beliefs;self-knowledge;Normative Reasons;defeat;Dispositional Property;evidentialism;Higher Order Evidence;motivational internalism;Epistemic Defeat;representational content;Epistemic Justification;dispositions;Dispositional Framework;competences;Narrow Scope Reading;circularity problem;Positive Epistemic Status;disposition ascriptions;Higher Order Belief;perceptual entitlement;Rational Commitment;Tyler Burge;Perceptual Reasons;cognitive penetration;Epistemically Significant;higher-order defeat;Red Table;higher-order evidence;Deontological Justification;inference