Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered

1. Introduction

Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge

Part I. The Source of Skepticism

2. Sceptical Invariantism and the Source of Scepticism Sceptical Invariantism and the Source of Scepticism

Duncan Pritchard

3. Epistemic Standards: Impersonal, not Invariant

Krista Lawlor

Part II. Arguments for Infallibilist Skepticism

4. A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism

Nevin Climenhaga

5. Skeptical Invariantism, Considered

Gregory Stoutenburg

6. Moderate Pragmatic Skepticism, Moorean Invariantism, and Attributions of Intellectual Virtue/Vice

Christos Kyriacou

Part III. Arguments for Fallibilist Skepticism

7. In Defense of a Moderate Skeptical Invariantism

Davide Fassio

8. A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism

Robin McKenna

9. Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation

Michael Hannon

10. Situationism, Implicit Bias, and Skepticism

Kevin Wallbridge

Part IV. Wittgensteinian Anti-Skepticism

11. "I Know", "I know", "I know." Hinge Epistemology, Invariantism and Skepticism

Annalisa Coliva

12. 'Logical' and 'Epistemic' Uses of 'to Know' or 'Hinges' as Logical Enabling Conditions

Genia Schoenbaumsfeld

Part V. Assertion and Knowledge Discourse

13. Assertion Compatibilism

Mona Simion

14. Knowledge and Loose Talk

Alexander Dinges

15. Knowledge Claims and the Context of Assessment

Wayne A. Davis

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• Epistemologia e teoria do conhecimento: Filosofia

Knowledge Ascriptions;Christos Kyriacou;Epistemic Standard;Kevin Wallbridge;Radical Skepticism;Michael Hannon;Epistemic Probability;Herman Cappelen;Testimonial Knowledge;Krista Lawlor;Gettier Cases;Robin McKenna;Error Theory;Michael Blome-Tillmann;Practical Stakes;Alexander Dinges;Competent Deduction;Wayne A. Davis;Ordinary Empirical Propositions;Davide Fassio;Epistemic Evaluation;Mona Simion;Skeptical Argument;Nevin Climenhaga;Loose Talk;Annalisa Coliva;Epistemic Practices;Eleonora Cresto;Error Possibilities;Duncan Pritchard;Radical Skeptics;epistemology;Radical Sceptical Hypotheses;skepticism;Intellectual Virtues;skeptical invariantism;Epistemic Position;knowledge;Knowledge Claims;Closure Principles;epistemic variantism;Bank Case;practical reasoning;Cumulative Case Argument;assertion;Epistemic Contextualism;fallibilism;Vice Versa;pragmatic skepticism;infallibilism;hinge epistemology;internalism;externalism