Sensations, Thoughts, Language

Introduction

Arthur Sullivan

Part I: Philosophy of Language, and Relations between Semantics and Psychology

1. Intention Recognition as the Mechanism of Human Communication

Daniel Harris

2. Loar, Donnellan, and Frege on Descriptions

John Perry

3. Modes of Presentation in Attitude Reports

Francois Recanati

4. Expression-Meaning and Vagueness

Stephen Schiffer

5. Limning the External Dimensions of Meaning

Arthur Sullivan

Part II: On Content in the Philosophy of Mind

6. Relational vs. Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality

David Bourget

7. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide

Uriah Kriegel

8. Cognitive Phenomenology, Sensory Phenomenology, and Rationality

Michelle Montague

9. Loar's Compromised Internalism

David Pitt

10. Loar on Lemons: the Particularity of Perception and Singular Perceptual Content

Mark Sainsbury

11. The Sense of 'Looks'

Michael Tye

Part III: The Metaphysics of Intentionality and Consciousness

12. Hard, Harder, Hardest

Katalin Balog

13. "Phenomenal States" and the Scope of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy

Janet Levin

14. Phenomenal Concepts and the First-Person Perspective

Joseph Levine

15. The Non-Primacy of Subjective Intentionality

Georges Rey

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• Cognição e psicologia cognitiva
• A teoria psicológica e escolas de pensamento
• Literatura: história e crítica
• Filosofia da mente
• Filosofia da linguagem
• Semântica, análise do discurso, etc
• Filosofia: metafísica e ontologia

High Order Vagueness;Undetached Rabbit Parts;Arthur Sullivan;Phenomenal Intentionality;Brian Loar;Phenomenal Concept;Katalin Balog;Phenomenal States;David Bourget;Vice Versa;Ray Buchanan;Coherent Option;Daniel Harris;Cognitive Phenomenology;Uriah Kriegel;Intentional Content;Janet Levin;Explanatory Gap;Joseph Levine;Physical Functional States;Brian McLaughlin;Natural Kind Terms;Michelle Montague;Externalist Theses;Casey O'Callaghan;Internalist Theses;David Pitt;Burge's Arguments;Francois Recanati;Phenomenal Properties;Georges Rey;Recognitional Concepts;Stephen Schiffer;Shortest Spy;Michael Tye;Vague Predicate;philosophy of language;Singular Content;philosophy of mind;Russellian Propositions;metaphysics;Belief Reports;semantics;Phenomenal Character;consciousness;Metaphysically Indeterminate;philosophy of psychology;Red Ball;content;intentionality;phenomenal concept strategy;undetermination;functionalism;content inessentialism;essence;explanation;content determinacy;presentation;subjective;social content;psychological content;meaning;visual illusions