Illuminating Errors

Introduction Rodrigo Borges and Ian Schnee Part 1: The Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge Section 1: Justification and Essential Falsehoods 1. Norms of Belief and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge E.J. Coffman 2. We Are Justified in Believing that KFK is Fundamentally Wrong Peter D. Klein 3. No Knowledge From Falsity Fred Adams 4. Harmless Falsehoods Martin Montminy 5. Knowledge from Blindspots Rhys Borchert, Juan Comesana, and Timothy Kearl Section 2: Gettier, Safety and Defeasibility 6. Knowledge from Error and Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology Duncan Pritchard 7. Epistemic Alchemy? Stephen Hetherington 8. The Benign/Malignant Distinction for False Premises Claudio de Almeida 9. Knowledge, Falsehood, and Defeat Sven Bernecker Part 2: Beyond the Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge Section 3: Reasoning, Hinges and Cornerstones 10. The Developmental Psychology of Sherlock Holmes: Counter-Closure Precedes Closure Roy Sorensen 11. Inferential Knowledge, Counter Closure, and Cognition Michael Blome-Tillmann and Brian Ball 12. Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Wittgenstein's On Certainty: A Dialogue Michael Veber 13. Vaults Across Reasoning Peter Murphy 14. Entitlement, Leaching and Counter-Closure Federico Luzzi Section 4: Knowledge: From Falsehoods and of Falsehoods 15. Why is Knowledge from Falsehood Possible? An Explanation John Turri 16. The Assertion Norm of Knowing John Biro 17. Knowledge Without Factivity Kate Nolfi 18. Knowing the Facts, Alternative and Otherwise Clayton Littlejohn

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• Filosofia da mente
• Psicologia
• Epistemologia e teoria do conhecimento: Filosofia

Rodrigo Borges;Ian Schnee;Claudio de Almeida;Fred Adams;J.R. Fett;Sven Bernecker;Michael Blome-Tillmann;John Biro;Brian Ball;E.J. Coffman;Juan Comesana;Stephen Hetherrington;Risto Hilpinen;Peter Klein;Clayton Littlejohn;Federico Luzzi;Anna-Sara Malmgren;Martin Montminy;Peter Murphy;Kate Nolfi;Duncan Pritchard;Roy Sorensen;John Turri;Michael Veber;illuminating errors;non-knowledge;knowledge;knowledge from non-knowledge;falsehoods;knowledge principle;inferential knowledge;false premises;Gettier Problem;counter closure;practical knowledge;epistemic alchemy;unknowable;propositional knowledge;entitlement;inferential integration;harmless falsehoods;regress argument;foundationalism;knowledge transmission;Vice Versa;Gettier Cases;Epistemic Luck;Competent Deduction;Doxastically Justified;Justified Belief;False Belief;Propositional Justification;False Premise;Knowledge Attribution;Justified True Belief;Smith's Belief;Target Belief;Target Proposition;Defeasibility Theory;False Lemma;Epistemic Risk;Extra Reasons;Epistemic Subjects;Inferential Path;Smith's False Belief