Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition

Introduction Michael Schmitz and Gabriele M. Mras

Part I: Force and Unity

1. Force and Content Charles Travis

2. Force, Mood and the Unity of the Proposition Maria van der Schaar

3. Concept, Truth and the Unity of the Proposition Gabriele M. Mras

4. Force, Content and the Varieties of Unity Michael Schmitz

Part II: Force and Cancellation

5. The Varieties of Cancellation Peter Hanks

6. Entertaining as Simulation Francois Recanati

7. Force Cancellation and Force Liberation Eleni Manolakaki

Part III: Force, Content, Truth and Satisfaction

8. Global Expressivism and the Puzzle of Truth-Apt Sentences Stephen Barker

9. Preliminaries for a Speech-Act Theory of Imperative Content Christopher Hom and Jeremy Schwartz

10. Force, Content and Translucent Self-Ascriptions Mitch Green

11. On a Neglected Fregean Motive for Distinguishing Between Content and Force Mark Textor

12. Truthmaking, Satisfaction and the Force-Content Distinction Friederike Moltmann

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• Filosofia da mente
• Filosofia: metafísica e ontologia
• Filosofia da linguagem
• Filosofia: a lógica

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